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 Preface 
This report is financed by Norwegian Shipowners’ Association (Norges Rederiforbund). The study has 
been carried out in the period August-December 2007. The objective of the study has been to examine 
possible regulation systems for CO2 emissions from international ship traffic, and compare strengths 
and weaknesses of these. The report will be forwarded to the Norwegian Ministry of Environment, as 
a background for a possible Norwegian submission to the next meeting of the Marine Environment 
Protection Committee (MEPC) of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in March/April 2008 
(MEPC 57), where mechanisms for controlling CO2-emissions from international shipping will be 
considered. The assessment and development of mechanisms for regulating CO2 emissions is part of a 
process which is to be concluded in 2009.  
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1 Introduction 
In this report we explore possible regulation systems for greenhouse gas emissions from 
international ship traffic, and compare their strengths and weaknesses. 
There are two motivations for studying regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from ships 
in international trade. The first motivation is the stronger pressure felt to regulate emissions 
from international shipping, given that these emissions presently are not subject to any 
regulation, that ships are responsible for some 2 - 3% of global CO2 emissions, and that 
emissions are expected to increase with increased demand for sea transportation. Emissions 
from international shipping were exempted from the Climate Convention (UNFCCC) and the 
Kyoto Protocol. However, article 2.2 of the protocol states that industrialized countries “shall 
pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of GHGs not controlled by the Montreal Protocol 
from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through the ICAO and the IMO, 
respectively”. If the International Maritime Organization (IMO) does not live up to this 
challenge, greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping might be regulated at 
regional level, for instance within the EU, where inclusion of marine transport in EU’s 
Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is considered. Unilateral action by EU is possible in 
legal terms as long as the principle of “right of innocent passage” is not compromised. 
The second motivation for ship owners and countries with a sizeable ship sector to engage 
in climate regulation of ship traffic is the opportunity to influence the design and 
implementation of a regulation system. This could also contribute to a practical and 
knowledge-based regulation system. 
For the design and implementation of regulation systems we are concerned with three 
major types of efficiency. The first type is that a regulation system should lead to 
environmental efficiency; it should contribute to significant reductions of global greenhouse 
gas emissions. By itself a policy tool or regulation system does not necessarily lead to 
significant mitigation of emissions; this depends on the strictness of targets and 
implementation of a regulation system. The second type is cost-effectiveness, which is to 
mean that the regulation system as far as possible should minimize the cost to society of 
reaching the environmental target envisaged. The third type is administrative efficiency, 
which means that implementation and operation of the regulation system should be as little 
resource-demanding as possible. 
Emissions from shipping consist of various gases and particles that have warming or 
cooling (or both) effects on climate. Carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) are the key compounds emitted. These emissions influence atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases and aerosols. The effects occur on different timescales 
ranging from days to centuries, and the spatial distributions of the climate effects are 
different, which make evaluation and comparisons complicated. In this report, however, we 
limit the scope to regulation of CO2 emissions, and refer those interested in details on 
emissions and climate effects from shipping to Annex 1 and references therein. 
The scope of this report is to select a small number of possible regulation schemes for CO2 
emissions from international shipping and assess how well each perform with regard to a set 
of criteria that are spelled out. We present a qualitative evaluation, where strengths and 
weaknesses of the schemes are compared. The focus is on stimulating ship owners to reduce 
emissions trough reduced fuel consumption, or in the longer term to use alternative fuels. 
In the next chapter we briefly discuss main policy tools for regulating CO2 emissions from 
ships, followed by an overview of existing and planned regulations of CO2 emissions from 
ships. The fourth chapter examines important criteria a regulation system for ships should 
satisfy. In the fifth chapter we present five selected regulation schemes for ships, which are 
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followed by an assessment of how well these alternatives fare on the criteria. Finally, in the 
seventh chapter, the study is summarized. 
2 Main policy tools for regulating emissions from ships 
Basically there are two types of environmental regulations: ‘command and control’ and 
market-based instruments. They differ foremost with regard to firms’ ability to make 
decisions on emission reductions. With command and control, the regulator gives a firm 
permission to emit a certain amount of pollution, thus making many of the pollution control 
decisions for the firm, and thereby also limiting the firm’s choice. Market-based instruments 
give more freedom to the firm, simply providing an incentive for the firm to find the best way 
to reduce pollution. As a firm generally is better informed about emission reduction costs, it is 
usually able to find a more cost-effective solution than the regulator using ‘command and 
control’. Furthermore, marked-based instruments are more flexible than ‘command and 
control’ as they more easily allow firms to introduce better solutions later as technologies 
evolve. In the following discussion we focus on market-based instruments since these are 
likely to provide for more cost-effective solutions.  
2.1 A charge on emissions 
Introducing a charge on each ton of CO2 makes emitters face the social cost of their 
emissions. This is one way of obtaining cost-effectiveness. To maximize profits, firms will 
reduce emissions until the cost of cutting back one more unit of CO2 is equal to the charge 
they have to pay to emit one more unit. A charge controls the price of CO2, but the exact 
quantitative effect, that is effect on emissions, cannot be determined beforehand. However, 
the quantitative effect can be observed after a while, although other factors also might have 
affected the emission level. The quantitative effect will be larger in the long term than short 
term since long-term flexibility is larger due to replacement of equipment that has a long life-
length. In the ship sector this translates to scrapping of old ships and contracting new ships. 
2.2 Emissions trading 
A system for emissions trading is established by setting a total cap on emissions, dividing the 
cap into allowances (also named quotas or permits), usually equivalent to 1 ton of CO2 each, 
and allocate these allowances to emitters. Firms are not allowed to emit more CO2 than the 
amount of CO2 allowances they possess. When firms buy or sell allowances the market 
determines a price to emit one ton of CO2. Firms with a relatively low cost of emission 
reduction will reduce more and sell freed allowances, whereas high-cost firms will reduce less 
and buy allowances. Emissions trading leads to a cost-effective solution since all firms face 
the same price for emitting one more ton of CO2. Trading with CO2 emission allowances was 
introduced in the EU ETS and in the Norwegian emissions trading system from 2005. The 
Norwegian system will be a part of the European system from January 2008. Emissions 
trading will also be initiated under the Kyoto Protocol from 2008. As opposed to a charge on 
emissions, an emissions trading system fixes the quantity of emissions but allows the price to 
vary. In theory both the CO2 price and effect on emissions will be the same for a charge and 
an emissions trading system. 
The efficiency of this type of scheme depends on how allowances are distributed. Before 
the first trading period of a new emission trading system allowances can be auctioned or 
given out for free, or by combining these methods. Also for allowances for later trading 
periods either of these allocation methods can be used. Provided the regulator has set aside an 
allowance reserve in a trading period, for instance as a provision for new firms, spare 
allowances can be sold on the market. 
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2.2.1 Free allocation 
Free allocation of allowances is often the most politically feasible solution but has several 
disadvantages. The regulator would need to gather sufficient information to be able to 
distribute the allowances. The allocation method is in contradiction with the polluters pay 
principle. The incentive effect to reduce emissions remains in the case of free allowances, 
however, since the cost of CO2 emissions is visible to the firm. There is an alternative cost to 
emitting CO2 since less emissions means allowances that can be sold on the market. The most 
common principle of free allocation is grandfathering, whereby allowances are given out in 
proportion to emissions in an earlier period. This type of reward for the largest emitters may 
be seen as unfair to other firms that have already reduced their emissions significantly. 
Free allowances lead to distortions if allocation is based on emissions that a firm can 
influence, for instance if next period allocation depends on present period emissions. Then 
there will be an incentive for the firm to reduce its emissions less than it would otherwise do. 
In a more dynamic perspective free allocation of allowances can lead to the establishment of 
new firms that do not employ the most effective technology and thus emits too much CO2. 
Furthermore such an allocation method easily leads to unproductive lobbyism. 
In the case of shipping, and if free allowances are given to existing ships, new ships might 
be given new allowances to avoid distortion of competition. If these allowances are given in 
proportion to expected emissions, ships that emit more might be rewarded in relative terms, 
which is not desirable. If ships are kept in operation for the benefit of receiving free 
allowances this introduces a distortion since these ships should have been scrapped and 
replaced by more efficient ships. This problem is an argument for letting ship owners keep the 
allowances even if ships cease to operate. 
The problems related to free allowances is more pronounced for shipping than for other 
sectors. The activity level varies a lot, and therefore allocating allowances based on one or a 
few base years will be more difficult than for land-based activities. Basing allocation on 
expected emissions is also difficult, as the emissions vary a lot from ship to ship.1 It would 
require a lot of administrative work for a regulator to gather sufficient information. A further 
difficulty is represented by ship owners having private information on costs to reduce 
emissions and may have strategic reasons to hold back this information since if may affect the 
allocation of free allowances. 
2.2.2 Auctioning allowances 
Auctioning of allowance can avoid the incentive problems associated with free allowances 
discussed above. Being faced with the ‘full’ cost of emitting CO2, instead of just the 
alternative cost that free allocation represents, firms might be more keen to invest in more 
efficient technologies, as the gains becomes more visible. Even though auctions have to be 
arranged, this way of allocating allowances requires less administration than free allowances. 
2.3 Standards 
A standard represents a ‘command and control’ instrument. A regulator can specify the 
technical construction or operational practices for a ship to meet the standard. Both the 
technical construction and the operational practices influence CO2 emissions from a ship. 
Potential emission reductions from various measures are shown in Table 1. Note that the 
reduction potential from operational measures can be larger than the potential from technical 
measures. 
 
1 There are even large variations between sister ships, i.e. ships that have equal design. For more 
information, see the Marintek et al (2000) report on the IMO index and CE Delft et al. (2006), Part B.  
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Table 1. CO2 reduction potential by measures.2 Source: Marintek et al. (2000). 
 
Three standard types exist: 
A technical standard gives specific instructions on how a ship should be built, i.e. the 
choice of propeller or measures for the machine.  
                                                     
2 These tables give an overview of various technical and operational measures. For more details please 
confer Marintek et al. (2000), page 14-15. 
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A design emission standard specifies the expected CO2 emission level required of a new 
ship when operated in a certain way under normal conditions. The ship builder is free to 
choose among technical solutions that will provide this level.  
Note that both a technical standard and a design emission standard only put restrictions on 
the construction of the ship, and do not limit the actual emissions, which depend on both how 
the ship is constructed and on how it is operated. This is the major disadvantage with these 
types of standards. 
 An operational emission standard or performance standard requires a ship to meet certain 
levels of CO2 emissions per unit of work during operation. In the case of shipping, this can be 
CO2 emissions per ton of cargo or passenger transported per nautical mile. The ship owner is 
free to choose how this level should be met. He can either order a new, efficient ship, or 
upgrade an existing ship, and be less concerned about the operation of the ship. Alternatively, 
he can order a less efficient ship, or use an existing ship, and be careful to operate it in a way 
that leads to lower emissions, for example by reducing speed. 
Technical standards represent a less flexible option than both a design emission standard 
and an operational emission standard since it requires the usage of one certain technology in 
the construction of a ship. As there are numerous ways for a ship to limit its emissions, 
requiring one specific technology will limit the ship owner’s choice. It will also require a lot 
of work for the regulator to find the most suitable design. The best technology for one ship 
may not be the best for another ship. Furthermore, technological development will almost 
certainly provide even better technologies in the future. The ship owners and the market will 
find the best technology if a proper price on emissions is established. If the best technology, 
i.e. the one that gives the cheapest emission reductions for each ship, is not applied, the total 
costs of emission reduction in the sector will turn out to be higher than necessary.      
Because of the large variety of ship types and sizes, many different standards are required. 
This is further discussed in section 5.2. 
A standard can be combined with an emissions charge, and also with a credit. If a ship does 
not meet these requirements, it will have to pay for exceeding emissions, and if emissions are 
lower than the standard they receive a credit. A standard with charge and credit therefore in 
some ways resembles a market-based regulation. An example of such as regulation scheme is 
further discussed in 5.2.2, where an operational emission standard is combined with emission 
fee, and possibly a credit. 
2.4 Other instruments 
There are other policy tools to reduce emissions. Implementing a subsidy or reward for 
pollution control will have the same effect as a charge in the short run, but leads to excess 
pollution in the long run. In such as regulation system polluters are paid for each ton reduced 
emission compared to a reference level, for instance emissions last year. Public funds to 
finance a subsidy must be raised from distorting taxes that lead to efficiency losses. Hence, 
this is not the most viable option.  
A hybrid emission trading scheme adds a “trigger price” to a standard emission trading 
scheme. Such a scheme sets an upper bound on the marginal cost of abatement through 
capping the allowance price, but otherwise operates like an emissions trading program. The 
regulator can implement the price cap through selling allowances from a reserve if the market 
price hits the cap, or can simply allow firms to pay the fee (which is equal to the price cap) for 
the number of allowances being short to emissions. Such a hybrid system fails to guarantee a 
particular emission level, but does guarantee a price cap per ton of CO2 for its users. Pizer 
(1997) argues that some hybrid system designs may be more efficient than both a traditional 
emission trading system and a charge system. 
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3 Existing and planned regulations for ships 
To date, there are no regulations on the emissions of greenhouse gases from ships in 
international trade. There exist regulations on other environmental problems related to 
international ship traffic. Here we briefly present ongoing processes in the IMO, the EU, and 
Norway with respect to regulating CO2-emissions from international and domestic shipping. 
3.1 International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
The IMO was established in 1948 for the purpose of developing and maintaining a 
comprehensive regulatory framework for international ship traffic. Safety, security, 
competency of seafarers and protection of the environment are main areas. Prevention of air 
pollution from ships, and hereunder emissions of greenhouse gases, is dealt with by the 
Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), one of the specialized committees under 
the IMO. 
The most important regulation on marine pollution is the MARPOL 73/78 Convention. In 
1997, air pollution was included in Annex VI. Up to present, greenhouse gas emissions are 
not included. While a new instrument addressing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions may not 
be included in MARPOL Convention, it provides useful provisions in relation to an 
instrument regulating GHG emissions from international shipping. 
 
” Enforcement 
Any violation of the MARPOL 73/78 Convention within the jurisdiction of any Party 
to the Convention is punishable either under the law of that Party or under the law of 
the flag State. In this respect, the term "jurisdiction" in the Convention should be 
construed in the light of international law in force at the time the Convention is 
applied or interpreted. 
 
With the exception of very small vessels, ships engaged on international voyages 
must carry on board valid international certificates which may be accepted at foreign 
ports as prima facie evidence that the ship complies with the requirements of the 
Convention. 
 
If, however, there are clear grounds for believing that the condition of the ship or its 
equipment does not correspond substantially with the particulars of the certificate, or 
if the ship does not carry a valid certificate, the authority carrying out the inspection 
may detain the ship until it is satisfied that the ship can proceed to sea without 
presenting unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment.” 
 
“Amendment Procedure 
Amendments to the technical Annexes of MARPOL 73/78 can be adopted using the 
"tacit acceptance" procedure, whereby the amendments enter into force on a specified 
date unless an agreed number of States Parties object by an agreed date. 
 
In practice, amendments are usually adopted either by IMO's Marine Environment 
Protection Committee (MEPC) or by a Conference of Parties to MARPOL.”3
 
3 Confer www.imo.org; section about MARPOL. 
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“Inspection and monitoring of compliance are the responsibility of member States, 
but the adoption of a Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme is expected to play 
a key role in enhancing implementation of IMO standards.”4
 
In 2000, the IMO published a report that considered the contribution to climate change from 
ship emissions, and evaluated ways to regulate these emissions.5 This concluded that the 
following strategies could be feasible at that time: 
1. Explore the interests for entering into voluntary agreements on GHG emission 
limitations between the IMO and the ship owners, or to use environmental 
indexing. 
2. Start working on how to design emission standards for new and possibly also for 
existing vessels. 
3. Pursue the possibilities of credit trading from additional abatement measures 
implemented on new and possibly also on existing vessels.  
 
This is based on the assumption that it is too difficult to implement strict regulations on 
international shipping, due to its evasive nature. More recent reports, however, claim that the 
informational barriers that inhibit a proper regulation of this sector are possible to overcome.  
In recent years, IMO has developed a CO2 index, which we discuss further in section 5.2. It 
was adopted in 2005, and implemented on a voluntary basis until 2008 as a trial period. 
“Industry, organizations and interested Administrations are invited to promote the use of the 
attached Interim Guidelines in trials and report their experiences back to MEPC 58 (October 
2008).” (IMO 2005) This can be considered as an important step towards establishing an 
international regulation regime for CO2 emissions, but will only lead to small emission 
reductions if it is not used as a base for a more stringent policy. 
At MEPC 56 (July 2007) it was agreed to establish a Correspondence Group to discuss 
possible approaches on technical, operational and market-based measures to address GHG 
emissions from ships and report to MEPC 57 (March/April 2008), in order to speed up the 
process with the aim to conclude in 2009. 
3.2 The European Union (EU) 
Within the EU, more progress on regulation on emissions from ships has been made. A 
strategy to reduce atmospheric emissions was presented in November 2002. This included 
emissions leading to both air pollution and climate change.6 However, only the work on air 
pollution has resulted in concrete action, as for example a directive as regards the sulfur 
content of marine fuel that came into force in August 2005.7
In December 2006, a report written for the European Commission was finalized. Due to the 
lack of progress in the IMO, the European Commission wanted to explore the possibility of a 
regional regulation system.8 Three policy options were considered to be the most promising 
ones: 
4 Confer www.imo.org; section “About IMO”. 
5 MARINTEK, et al. (2000). Study of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships. International Maritime 
Organisation. 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/transport.htm#3 
7 EU (2005). Directive 2005/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
8 CE Delft et al. (2006). Greenhouse Gas Emissions for Shipping and Implementation Guidance for the 
Marine Fuel Sulfur Directive. CE Delft. 
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1. A requirement to meet a unitary CO2 index limit value 
2. Mandatory differentiation of harbor dues (possibly based on the CO2 index) 
3. Inclusion of maritime transport in EU ETS 
 
EU has stated that they prefer a global solution for international shipping under the 
auspices of IMO. If, however, IMO has not been able to agree on an acceptable solution by 
2009, EU intends to include shipping in the EU ETS. 9
3.3 Norway 
In Norway, domestic shipping is required to pay a CO2 charge on the use of mineral oil 
(Norwegian Ministry of the Environment 2007). This corresponds to approximately 25 
EUR/ton of CO2.10  
Norway has signaled that emissions from international transport must be subject to CO2 
emission regulations in the future. The Norwegian Prime Minister said at the UN Secretary-
General’s High Level Event on Climate Change in September 2007 that “In our view 
international air transport and maritime transport need to be included in the carbon market.”11  
Traditionally, Norway has been working through the IMO to reach an agreement on how to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping. Norway supported the 
voluntary implementation of the CO2 index (confer section 5.2; Norwegian Ministry of the 
Environment 2007). In July 2007, Norway submitted a proposal at Marine Environment 
Protection Committee’s (MEPC) 56th Session. This proposal is described in section 5.4 and 
evaluated in section 6. 
4 Criteria a regulation system for ships must satisfy 
Both the establishment and operation of a system for regulating CO2 emissions from ships 
must satisfy a number of requirements or criteria. In this section we discuss the following 
criteria which are deemed important for carbon dioxide regulation systems for ships: Level 
playing field; Robust; Simple administration; Cost-effective; Flexible; Internationally 
acceptable; Money generated channeled back into sector; Legally feasible; Can be 
implemented soon. 
It is likely that all criteria cannot be satisfied at the same time, meaning that there are trade-
offs between them. Consequently an assessment of regulation systems based on these criteria 
will be forced to prioritize among them. To this issue we return in section 6. 
4.1 To what extent does a regulation scheme ensure a level playing 
field for all ships? 
A regulation system for ships should be neutral across all nations and ship categories for the 
purpose of eliminating the possibility of evasion and leakage of emissions, and to avoid 
reduced competitiveness of ship owners that comply with regulations. Thus the instruments 
implemented to put a price on CO2 emissions should not lead to any unwanted market 
distortions in terms of other environmental or commercial effects. Ship owners should not be 
subject to less stringent regulations by changing flag. 
9 http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSL1639411220070416. 
10 Approximately 200 NOK/ton CO2.  
11 http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/smk/primeminister/Prime-Minister-Jens-Stoltenberg/Speeches-
and-Articles/2007/Speech-at-The-Secretary-Generals-High-Le.html?id=481637. 
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Another dimension of level playing field is related to marine transport as compared to other 
modes of transportation. For some freight categories and routes there is competition between 
ship transport and rail or truck transport, and even air transport in some cases. The ideal 
solution is that all modes of transportation pay the same price per ton of CO2 emitted (and for 
other negative environmental effects, such as air pollution from aerosols). This is, however, 
generally not the case, but at least in some European countries environmental or climate 
regulations on land transport through taxes exist. The exception is aviation, where there up till 
now is close to no environmental regulation, but where EU is planning to include aviation in 
EU ETS from 2011-2012. 
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
countries have “common but differentiated responsibilities” (United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 1992). If one should introduce differentiated responsibilities 
for ships dependent on the flag state, e.g. less stringent regulation for ships from developing 
countries, this would distort competition and make the scheme less robust as the ships can 
evade it by flagging out to other countries. Besides, only including industrialized countries 
would not provide the necessary effect since only 15% of the world fleet is registered in these 
countries. 
There are, however, other ways to differentiate between ships that might induce fewer 
distortions. CE Delft et al. (2006) and Faber et al. (2007) have considered differentiation 
based on the route of the vessel. Another is to base it on the origin or destination of the cargo. 
A recent workshop concluded that, in general, no technical issues related to monitoring and 
reporting remains that can not be solved.12 This also holds for differentiation, and is in line 
with other conclusions on this topic. Both systems of differentiation, however, will require 
large amount of data, especially the one based on cargo. 
Even though a system ensures a level playing field, it can still differentiate between 
countries by for example spending parts of the funds collected from the scheme on adaptation 
projects in developing countries. There might also be other ways to compensate these 
countries to make them willing to adopt a scheme that avoids distortions. 
For this study, however, we require that the regulation system for CO2 emissions from 
ships is so designed that the price on emissions is independent of the flag state of the ships, 
thus achieving a genuine level playing field. 
4.2 To what extent can evasion of a regulation scheme be prevented? 
In the context of a regulation system for ship robustness means that it is difficult for ship 
owners to shirk their obligations according to the system. A ship owner will have incentives 
to follow the regulations if the probability of being caught and the cost of non-compliance are 
sufficiently large. This requires a well-functioning reporting, monitoring, and verification, 
and not the least an enforcement system. An obvious possibility is for ships to be able to 
provide proper documentation to any port state control officer that show that they follow the 
regulations. However, there is always a possibility to falsify documents to avoid paying for 
the emissions. This requires regular monitoring and verification of ship activities, and the 
possibility to impose fines on ships that are not in compliance to increase the robustness of 
any regulation scheme. It might be too costly to verify the activities of all ships, so an 
alternative is to select a random sample of ships for thorough investigation.  
12 For more information, see Norwegian Ministry of the Environment et al. (2007), Technical 
Workshop on Bunker Fuel Emissions Bulletin, International Institute for Sustainable Development. 
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4.3 Is administration of a regulation scheme simple for flag states? 
For a given emission reduction target for the maritime sector, and cost-effectiveness achieved, 
the regulation scheme with the lowest administrative costs has the preference. Introduction of 
a charge appears to be easier than an emissions trading system, since an emission trading 
market requires more procedures and institutions for allocation of allowances, trading, 
reporting and verification, and a registry of emissions and allowances. 
A standard for emissions relative to transport (confer section 5.2) requires even more 
information to provide sufficient data to create a standard. Different ship categories and ship 
sizes show great variation in emissions per ton-kilometer transport, and there will be a 
tradeoff between making the scheme as effective and fair as possible and avoiding too 
complex administration due to differentiation between various ship categories. 
4.4 Can a regulation scheme achieve the emission reduction target at 
low overall cost? 
For a given emission reduction target for the ship sector, emissions should be reduced at 
lowest possible cost. If the ship sector is included in a wider regulation system the cost saving 
and thereby level of cost-effectiveness attained, can be even larger since more low-cost 
mitigation options should be available. Cost-effectiveness requires that the marginal cost of 
emissions, i.e. the cost for emitting one extra ton of CO2, is equal for all ships. In the case of 
emissions trading the price on emissions reflects the target in terms of total allowable CO2 
emissions set by the regulator. All ships will reduce emissions until the cost of reducing one 
more unit of CO2, is equal to the CO2 price, this being a charge or an allowance price. If ships 
do not face the same price on CO2 emissions, ship owners will adjust their reduction efforts to 
the different price levels, making the marginal emission reduction costs different across ships. 
This implies that total emission reduction cost could be lowered by reducing relatively more 
emissions from ships with low marginal costs.  
A cost-effective solution across sectors requires that the marginal cost of reductions in the 
maritime sector is equal to the marginal cost in other sectors. Thus the same charge on 
emissions or a wide emissions trading scheme would ensure a cost-effective way of reducing 
emissions across all sectors of the economy.  
4.5 Can a regulation scheme be easily modified? 
The regulation system should be flexible to allow adjustments of the system as a response to 
new information, changed circumstances, or general policy changes. There are uncertainties 
about future targets; the costs of emission reductions, how they may change over time, and 
what gases, particles and sectors that might be included in the regulation system in the future. 
This implies that regulations imposed today might be subject to change in the future, and thus 
one should be able to revise the regulation system in a transparent manner whenever new 
information and circumstances make this warranted. Although regulation should be robust, an 
excessively rigid system could actually be perceived as less credible and inhibit ship owners 
from undertaking necessary investments to meet future commitments. 
4.6 Can a regulation scheme be established and operated at low cost 
to make it acceptable to all states? 
The best solution is a global regulation system for CO2 emissions from ships. The alternative 
is regional regulation schemes. Regional schemes are much more exposed to evasion, and this 
clearly represents a second-best option. As countries have different characteristics and 
interests, it is difficult to tell what kind of regulation scheme that is most likely to be adopted. 
However, it is reasonable to believe that a scheme that is less strict, and hence less costly for 
ships, is more likely to be adopted and might therefore be a preferred first step. 
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The other option is to find ways of partly compensating the most skeptical countries. 
Developing countries could be opposed to a regulation system satisfying the level playing 
field criterion. They might find such a regulation system unfair and costly for them. However, 
they might be more willing to accept such a system if part of the money generated will be 
channeled back to the ship sector, and even more so to developing countries. This could be 
done by spending a portion of the funds generated on adaptation projects in developing 
countries to handle climate change, for instance the adaptation fund under the UNFCCC, or 
possibly through buying credits through the CDM mechanism. 
4.7 Are possible revenues from a regulation scheme recycled to the 
marine sector? 
When developing a regulation system for greenhouse gases for a sector there is usually no 
explicit constraint on the use of income from sale of allowances or charges paid to the 
regulator. In the case of a system of charges income goes to the regulator and commonly the 
regulator sees the spending of the income generated as a separate issue. This is also supported 
by most economic models, where the sought after effect is the incentive to reduce emissions 
due to the charge. The income can then be seen as any other tax income, and spent on any 
important task where public funding is required. In addition, if the income from charges is 
channeled back into the regulated sector, there is a significant risk that the incentive effect of 
the charge is reduced and therefore also the cost-effectiveness. Only if the money is 
channeled back in a way that the firms cannot influence, and in this context, particularly not 
influence by emitting more or less greenhouse gases, will distortions be avoided. Assuming 
that the charge is set at the correct level, the point is that recycling of income in effect lowers 
the effective charge level. In practice it is difficult to avoid all distortions of this type. 
If some or all allowances are auctioned in a cap-and-trade scheme, or some allowances later 
sold by the operator, and the revenue generated recycled to the marine sector, this could easily 
infringe on the cost-effectiveness of the trading system for the same reasons mentioned in the 
case of a charge. 
On this background a criterion on cost neutrality for the regulated sector may seem out of 
place. In this report, however, we assume that channeling money back to the ship sector 
increases the feasibility of an international regulation system for ships. If there is a non-
marginal net cost of the regulation system the possibility of having the most reluctant 
countries agree to the system seems slim. Therefore the challenge is to have the income 
somehow channeled back into the ship sector without this leading to distortions, at least not 
significant distortions. The ship owners should not be able to influence the probability of 
receiving parts of this revenue by taking actions that is not compatible with the intention of 
the scheme. Possible ways to reimburse ships are in proportion to their sailing distance, or as 
a fixed annual remuneration based on their IMO CO2-index.13 It is not evident that these types 
of recycling do not create unwanted incentives – e.g. sailing an extra mile means extra costs 
in terms of CO2, but a part of this cost will be offset by the extra revenue from the 
reimbursement. This means that the incentive effect of the CO2 cost will be weaker, so this 
reimbursement alternative could contain an important weakness.  
Another possibility is to create a Research and Development (R&D) fund for investments 
that can reduce future emissions, for example through increased fuel efficiency of ship 
engines. Implementing new, promising technologies is often long-term and associated with 
substantial risk. Experiences from early implementation could prove useful for further 
development of the technology. The marginal costs of reducing emissions by using a new 
technology is often declining in the total amount invested due to learning. Furthermore the 
value to society of developing such technologies is often larger than value for private firms, 
13 This is mentioned in Kågeson (2007).  
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leading to insufficient investments from a social perspective. Therefore using money 
generated by the regulation system for a R&D fund can provide an additional benefit for 
society, which also could balance some of the potential distortions from reimbursement. 
4.8 Is a regulation scheme legally feasible within IMO? 
Any regulation scheme for the marine sector must comply with the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). For a regulation system to be effective, 
enforcement must be possible. According to CE Delft et al. (2006) port states have wide 
discretion under general international law, and are able to require all ships, irrespective of 
flags, to meet certain conditions for entry into port. If these conditions are not met, the port 
State is able to expel or detain the ship. Even though port States may not have the right to 
force foreign ships to meet the conditions, or make them pay a fee if they do not, expelling 
them might be a strong enough enforcement instrument. Some policy options might be in 
conflict with international trade law. This holds especially for non-global (regional) systems. 
Regional systems are not discussed in this report, for one reason since they can lead to 
strategic behavior by ship owners to evade the regulation scheme. 
4.9 Can a regulation scheme be implemented soon? 
Due to the long lifetime of ships and investment decisions made continuously it is important 
that the cost of CO2 is taken into account as soon as possible. The first requirement for this is 
speedy adoption by IMO. The time needed by IMO and the implementation time is, however, 
difficult to predict. 
5 The selected regulation alternatives 
We have selected a small set of five regulation schemes for CO2 emissions from ships based 
on the policy literature, economic theory, and recent proposals to IMO. Other alternatives 
have been proposed, but these five alternatives are a good representation of the main 
alternatives.    
The examination of the alternatives is based on the assumption that they will be globally 
implemented. It is further assumed that IMO will adopt the scheme including the necessary 
control mechanisms and sanctions in case of non-compliance. This enforcement has to be 
tailor-made to each type of regulation scheme, primarily based on flag state control 
supplemented by secondary port state control. Other control authorities may be required, 
depending on the characteristics of each regulation alternative. 
The design and strictness of a scheme determines to what degree it leads to real emission 
cuts. In the case of a charge or an emissions trading system, both these approaches would end 
up with the same price level and the same emission reductions. The provision for such an 
outcome is the absence of market imperfections and uncertainty, and an appropriate 
specification of a charge system or an emission allowance system. 
We now examine the five regulation schemes in the following sequence: 
A. A cap-and-trade scheme. 
B. A design emission standard. 
C. An operational emission standard with fee. 
D. A charge on emissions from ships. 
E. A combined cap and charge scheme. 
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5.1 Alternative A: A cap-and-trade scheme 
In this scheme a cap on total emissions from the marine sector is agreed upon under the 
auspices of IMO. The scheme covers ship transport globally. We assume that this system is 
open through linking to a much wider emission trading system that covers many sectors. 
Examples of wider systems are trading under the Kyoto Protocol in the period 2008-2012, 
which is limited to industrialized countries, and trading under EU ETS in the period 2008-
2012 and beyond, which presently is limited to EU countries plus Norway. 
Taking the Kyoto Protocol and thus the period 2008-2012 as the case at hand, we find it 
unlikely that a cap-and-trade system for shipping can be an integral part of the Kyoto 
Protocol. However, we assume that ship owners are allowed to buy emission allowances from 
other sectors to comply with their cap on emissions. Ship owners could also be allowed to buy 
project-based credits from developing countries through the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI) credits from industrialized countries. But the marine 
sector is likely not allowed to sell allowances to other sectors since marine emissions (defined 
by the marine cap) would be additional to the emission cap defined by the Kyoto Protocol. 
Selling marine allowances to sectors included in the Kyoto Protocol would therefore increase 
supply of allowances under the protocol and reduce the equilibrium price. A global climate 
policy treaty beyond 2012 may, however, fully include marine transportation, and may also 
allow trading for a wider group of countries than the present Kyoto Protocol. In this case there 
would be no restrictions on trading between the marine sector and other sectors. 
One benefit of linking the marine sector scheme to the wider trading system is that this 
leads to a more cost-effective solution since more sectors face the same price on emissions. 
But since the marine sector is likely not allowed to sell allowances to other sectors a soft cap 
would reduce the allowance price within the sector. This not only implies smaller emission 
reductions from ships, but also reduces cost-effectiveness since an implication would be a 
lower allowance price in the marine sector than in the wider emission trading system. 
Therefore the cap for the marine sector should be set low enough to make sure that the 
regulation results in real emission cuts and leads to a cost-effective outcome. 
The following steps are required to establish a cap-and-trade emission trading system for 
shipping: 
 
1. IMO decides on a global cap and target period for CO2 emissions in the marine 
sector. 
2. The design of the trading scheme and its operation is coordinated with the 
regulating body of the wider trading scheme for the purpose of certifying 
compatibility with regard to features such as units, trading periods, registry, 
accounting, etc. Some co-ordination is also required for monitoring the two 
systems, and with regard to verification and enforcement. The most relevant 
wider trading scheme is found under the Kyoto Protocol and its three flexible 
mechanisms: emissions trading (for industrialized countries), JI (in industrialized 
countries) and CDM (in developing countries). 
3. Rules and procedures for trading with the wider emission trading system are 
negotiated and established. 
4. Allowances are distributed to ships (ship owners) based on auctions or on some 
type of grandfathering. Auctions could take place in each state or in a wider 
group of states. In case of grandfathering allowances are allocated for free based 
on emissions in an earlier period. An alternative method is to allocate free 
allowances based on bench-marking (for instance building on a CO2-index, valid 
both for existing ships and new buildings in all flag states), whereby free 
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allowances are given out at a level equivalent to the most efficient ships in a ship 
category (e.g. at level that corresponds to the 10% lowest-emitting ships per ton 
and mile). Another possibility is for some allowances to be given out for free 
based on the ship categories and index values illustrated in Table 2.  
5. Trading within the marine sector can commence, and eventually purchase of 
allowances or credits from the wider emission trading scheme. The market 
determines an allowance price. The price will vary over time according to supply 
and demand. 
6. A registry keeps track of emissions, stock of allowances and trading to certify 
that the allowance obligation for each ship is fulfilled for the specified accounting 
period(s). Emission calculations can be based on fuel consumption, possibly fuel 
bunkered e.g. six months back to reduce the possibilities for evading the system if 
the trading scheme is not global (confer Kågeson 2007). 
7. Each ship owner must take care to comply with his emission cap and allowance 
obligation in the trading period. Bunkered fuel must be reported so that CO2 
emissions can be calculated. During each accounting period (usually lasting one 
year) a ship owner must keep account of emissions, the stock of allowances (and 
CDM and JI credits), and take steps to purchase if there is a deficit or sell if there 
is a surplus. In case of surplus, allowances can alternatively be saved and used for 
compliance in the next accounting period. After the accounting period is ended a 
ship owner must surrender allowances equivalent to emissions, under the 
surveillance of the operator of the trading system. If there is a deficit in number 
of allowances, the operator can claim a fee per ton of CO2 to be paid by the ship 
owner, and the ship owner has to buy missing allowances and surrender these.  
 With regard to step 4, free allocation of allowances easily leads to efficiency distortions (a 
disincentive to invest in new measures to reduce emissions) as noted in section 2.2.1, but this 
problem can be resolved if allowances are auctioned (or sold by the regulator after trading has 
started). A common feature of trading systems is that the income generated from auctioning 
goes to each state government. However, in case the auctioning income is kept by the marine 
sector (e.g. IMO), it must be handled and redistributed in a way that minimizes disincentives 
in the next round. In regulation alternative E (confer section 5.4) such disincentives are 
reduced by generating a fund, and spending part of the fund on adaptation measures in 
developing countries, and on improving ship technologies and infrastructure in the marine 
sector. If the cap-and-trade scheme for the marine sector later is fully integrated in a wide 
emission trading system, it is unlikely that recycling of money back to sector will be accepted 
as this deviates from the conditions of other sectors included in the trading system. 
5.2 Design and operational emission standards 
Various forms of standards to regulate emissions exist. In terms of ship transport the main 
relevant types are a design emission standard and an operational emission standard. A design 
emission standard sets forth requirements for the construction of new ships, with a view to 
expected emissions. An operational emission standard is performance based and thus relates 
to allowable emissions per unit of transport conducted, for example emissions per ton and 
nautical mile. For all standards the regulator must decide on a manageable number of ship 
categories, for which a separate standard is developed and implemented. Given the large 
number of different ship constructions and sizes this means that each category will contain 
ship types of some heterogeneity. This limitation implies a certain efficiency loss when 
standards are employed in such a heterogeneous sector as shipping. We discuss these two 
main standard alternatives in turn.  
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5.2.1 Alternative B: Design emission standard  
In this regulation scheme the regulator decides on a suitable number of categories for new 
ships, and thereafter decides a required level of expected CO2 emissions for each category.14 
This expected level can be based on a certain operation of the ship under average conditions. 
The ship builder is free to choose among technical solutions that will provide this level.    
This requires substantial collection and processing of data. After establishing the standard 
scheme, implementation is relatively straightforward. Each ship should be inspected before 
delivery, and given a certificate if it is verified that the ship meets the standard. The task of 
verifying that new ships satisfy the standard should be left to an independent organization 
(such as Classification Societies acting as Recognized Organizations on behalf of flag states). 
If better designs are developed or more ambitious climate targets require a more stringent 
scheme, the standards can be tightened in the future. 
A major disadvantage of a design emission standard is that the effect on greenhouse gas 
emissions could be quite limited, since emissions to a large extent depends on how the ship is 
operated, where a design emission standard has no influence. 
A design emission standard on new ships will make sure that all new ships are built 
efficiently. This is important due to the long lifetime of ships. Other policy instruments such 
as a charge set at a high enough level could have a similar effect on new investments. The 
future cost savings justifying the investment in a more efficient ship today might be uncertain 
to ship owners. It will depend on both the fuel price and on the price on CO2, which might be 
highly volatile.15
In addition, as IMO has a long experience with standards, this regulation alternative might 
be easier accepted than a marked based instrument, and thus be implemented sooner. This 
will not exclude the possibility of implementing a marked based instrument in addition to 
give ship owners incentives to reduce emissions also when operating the ship. 
For new ships a design emission standard could be combined with an operational emission 
standard with fee, see next section. 
5.2.2 Alternative C: Operational emission standard with fee 
This regulation scheme implements a standard on actual emissions per ton and nautical mile 
from both new and existing ships. The ship owners are free to choose how to reduce 
emissions; either by improving the technical construction or operational practices of the ships. 
Imposing an operational emission standard with fee resembles an emission charge, except 
that the fee is only paid for emissions exceeding a certain limit, which is the standard. A 
stricter overall standard means lower emissions from the ship sector. This alternative will 
generate less revenue than the (pure) charge regulation alternative. The port state control 
officers could be given the responsibility to verify that fees are paid for the emissions 
exceeding the CO2 standard. In case of non-compliance, the ship could be detained until the 
fees plus a penalty are paid. 
A variant of this regulation scheme is to include a credit for ships that perform better than 
the standard, that is if emissions per ton and nautical mile is below the level specified by the 
standard. In such a case ship owners will have an incentive to do better than the standard 
imposed.  
14 In theory, a design emission standard could be implemented for existing ships as well. This is 
discussed in Marintek 2000. According to this study, a design emission standard for existing ship could 
lead to accelerated scrapping, which in turn would could reduce emissions, but is unlikely to be cost-
effective; it would be difficult to monitor and implement. 
15 The CO2 allowance price in the EU ETS has varied from 7-32 €/ton CO2 before the collapse of the 
price in autumn 2006. 
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Because of the large variety of ship types and sizes, many different standards are required. 
There are several ways to categorize ships. In general there is a tradeoff between the desire to 
differentiate and the need to limit the number of categories due to administrative simplicity. 
IMO has a CO2 index under development that reflects the fuel consumption per unit of 
transport work in ton-km. This index could be the basis for a standard, but there are some 
problems associated with it. Smaller ships will always be at a disadvantage compared with 
larger ships. In times of lower market demand, either globally or on specific routes or return 
voyages, the CO2 index will increase. Ship owners will only have limited possibilities to 
influence these developments. The index must therefore be so defined that it reflects different 
ship types, sizes and trade variations in a fair manner.16
Table 2 shows the variations in average IMO CO2 index between the 19 ship categories 
used in Lloyd’s Register, and illustrated hereby the need for differentiating between ship 
categories. This categorization is well established and statistical data is available for these 
categories. Since CO2 indexing is applicable only to ships performing transport work, ship 
categories that are not primarily designed to performing transport work are disregarded.  
 
Ship type Total number Index unit Average  Average  Ships 
  of ships   index 
gross 
tonnage in study 
LNG Tanker 175 g CO2 / ton n. mile 66,5 79652 3 
LPG Tanker 1020       0 
Chemical Tanker 2970 g CO2 / ton n. mile 23,5 20311 49 
Crude Oil Tanker 1850 g CO2 / ton n. mile 8,0 57703 46 
Product Tanker 5047       0 
Other Liquids  365       0 
Bulk Dry 5267 g CO2 / ton n. mile 7,6 81519 4 
Bulk Dry/Oil 152       0 
Self Discharging Bulk 
Dry 166       0 
Other Bulk Dry 1105       0 
General Cargo 15859       0 
Passenger/General 
Cargo 339       0 
Container 3283 g CO2 / ton n. mile 96,5 40021 23 
Refrigerated Cargo 1242 g CO2 / ton n. mile 124,3 9850 11 
RoRo Cargo 1959 g CO2 / ton n. mile 94,9 49294 29 
Passenger/RoRo 
Cargo 2743
g CO2 / car unit n. 
mile 9379,0 2894 199 
Passenger Ship 2873       0 
Other Dry Cargo 240       0 
Total 46654       364 
 
Table 2. Lloyd’s Registers ship categories. Source: CE Delft et al. (2006). 
                                                     
16 One possibility is to define an index based on a ships design parameters such as deadweight or gross 
tonnage and speed as a specified percentage of the engines’ max continuous rating. Such an index will 
also be a function of ship type and size. 
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In case emissions are below the standard, an option is for credits to be sold to other sectors 
with similar commitments to reduce their emissions. The administration of such a regulation 
system with trading of credits would be more complicated than with a charge on emissions 
(regulation alternative D). 
5.3 Alternative D: A charge on emissions from ships 
Emissions associated with fuel sold can be calculated from fuel sales. Availability and 
accessibility of marine fuel sales data is fairly good. On the other hand some off-shore 
bunkering and bunkering in states that are not a member of IMO may not be registered, confer 
the discussion in Annex 1 and the lower CO2 emissions estimated from on marine fuel in 
Figure A1. Thus incomplete sales data may give some ship owners an opportunity to evade a 
charge. The charge could be paid to IMO, and not to countries. The charge income could be 
used to establish a fund administered by IMO, and the money used to support implementation 
of new, promising technologies, and to other important measures to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions globally. 
When a charge is imposed, emitters have an incentive to reduce emissions as long as the 
marginal cost of reducing emissions is lower than the charge they would otherwise pay. The 
impact on emissions is equivalent if there are no market distortions, both in the case ship 
owners pay the charge, or in the case fuel suppliers do it. In both cases ships will bear the 
burden of the charge by facing an increased fuel price. In any case, the ships must prove that 
they have paid a charge on their emissions to be allowed to enter ports. This can be verified 
by port state control authorities. 
5.4 Alternative E: A combined cap and charge scheme 
This scheme has been proposed by Norway to IMO and is based on three elements. Firstly, it 
contains a cap on total CO2-emissions from international shipping, which is agreed by IMO. 
Secondly, a charge on CO2-emissions from all international shipping is introduced. Thirdly, a 
fund is established under the IMO, to which the emission charge is paid to. The fund should 
be controlled by a board established under IMO.  The purpose of the fund is threefold, and the 
charge income would fund: 
• Maritime industry GHG improvements; 
• CO2-credits purchased on emission trading markets; and 
• Climate change adaptation in developing countries. 
 
The first two components should jointly deliver the required emission reductions to meet 
the cap through improvement programs and emission offsets.  
The first portion of the fund would thus go to ship owners applying for financial aid for 
implementation of low-emission technology and practices, and to stimulate infrastructure 
improvements. The GHG reductions obtained would be additional to the ongoing technical 
and operational improvements in the ship sector.  
The second portion would be used for emission allowances and credits purchased at 
emission trading markets if the reductions from GHG projects within the shipping sector are 
not sufficient to meet the total emission cap. The emission allowances would be purchased 
through existing carbon markets, inter alia project-based credits such as CDM. Effectively, 
this portion of the fund would offset the emissions above the total cap of the entire 
international maritime transport sector with emission reductions elsewhere, and at lower cost.  
The third portion of the fund would be spent on projects in developing countries to help 
these countries to adapt to the impacts of climate change. The most straight-forward 
alternative is to support adaptation funds under the UNFCCC. 
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6 Assessment of regulation schemes with respect to criteria 
In this section we assess the five alternative regulation schemes for CO2 emissions from ships 
A, B, C, D and E with respect to the nine criteria described in chapter 4. Obviously such an 
assessment is subjective, both in terms of how well a regulation alternative fare on one 
criterion, and in terms of the importance of one criterion compared to other criteria. We carry 
out a qualitative assessment of relative strengths and weaknesses of the five regulation 
schemes with regard to the nine criteria. A summary of the discussion is presented in Table 3. 
6.1 Ensuring a level playing field 
The additional costs related to CO2 emissions are neutral across all nations and ship categories 
for all regulation alternatives if they are adopted globally. However, the standard alternatives 
B and particularly C are more complex due to large number of ship types and transportation 
activities, which makes a perfectly neutral effect difficult to obtain in practice, confer the 
discussion in section 5.2. For alternative A, a global cap and trade system, free allocation of 
allowances may compromise the level playing field criterion since it is difficult to design free 
allocation schemes that work perfectly neutral. 
6.2 Prevent evasion of the regulation scheme 
All schemes are more or less robust if they are implemented globally, making it difficult for a 
ship owner to shirk his commitments to reduce emissions. Due to the relative simplicity to 
implement scheme B, a design emission standard, this may be the most robust alternative. On 
the other hand, at a different note, scheme B is less robust than the other schemes since ship 
owners can operate ships in a way such that the effect on emissions is negligible. To some 
extent this is also the case for regulation scheme C, since it is impossible to design an 
operational emission standard that is sufficiently comprehensive to cover all ship types and 
trades well. 
6.3 Simple administration for flag states 
The pure charge and design emission standard alternatives seem to be the easiest to 
administer. A cap-and-trade regime seems more complicated to establish and administer. 
Operational emission standards combined with fee will be more costly to implement than the 
pure charge alternative. The cap and charge proposal (E) is combining a charge and purchase 
of allowances from other sectors. On this background we have chosen to give highest score 
for D, medium score for A and B, and lowest score for C and E. 
6.4 Achieving the emission reduction target at low overall cost 
The broad picture is that the four schemes A, C, D and E will provide emission reductions in 
a more or less cost-effective way. The cost of emitting CO2 will be equal for all entities. In 
this way the incentives to reduce emissions are also taken care of. However, a design 
emission standard (B) will fail to give effective incentives to reduce CO2 emissions since a 
ship owner that operates a ship in a manner that causes relatively high emissions will not pay 
anything extra for the additional emissions. In scheme C only emissions exceeding the 
standard are prone to pay the fee, unless combined with a credit for emissions lower than the 
standard. Also in the case of scheme E the level of cost-effectiveness can be somewhat 
reduced since the charge will likely be lower than the allowance price in a wide emission 
trading system. Accordingly we have given scheme B a low score and scheme A and D a high 
score on cost-effectiveness. 
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6.5 Easy to modify regulation scheme 
The emission standard alternatives B and C are probably less flexible than the others. Even if 
standards can be revised over time, this is more demanding given the complexity of different 
standards for different ship categories. Future knowledge, technology and policy changes will 
be possible to incorporate through regulating an emission fee in a more straight-forward 
manner. The cap in a cap-and-trade scheme can also be revised, but flexibility will be reduced 
within each trading period given a fixed total cap. Therefore we have given highest score for 
scheme D and lowest score for scheme B and C, whereas the other two receive a medium 
score. 
 
Regulation scheme Strengths Weaknesses 
A. Cap and trade • Cost-effective 
• Can be implemented soon 
• Difficult allocation in case of 
free allowances 
 
B. Design emission 
standard 
 
• Relative simple to establish 
• High acceptability 
• Can be implemented soon 
 
• Not cost-effective 
• Weak incentives 
• Low flexibility 
 
C. Operational emission 
standard with fee 
 
• Stronger incentives to reduce 
emissions than design 
emission standard 
• High acceptability 
 
• Complexity 
• Less cost-effective than cap-
and-trade and charge 
 
D. Charge on emissions 
 
• Cost-effective 
• High flexibility 
• Simple administration 
 
• Low acceptability 
 
E. Cap and charge 
 
• Higher acceptability than 
charge 
• Technology development 
 
• Less cost-effective than cap-
and-trade and charge 
• Complexity 
 
Table 3. Comparison of strengths and weaknesses of regulation schemes. 
 
6.6 Establish and operate the regulation scheme at low cost to make it 
acceptable to all states 
The score on this criterion depends on the implicit net cost for ship owners generated by a 
scheme, and how this compares across nations, ship categories and transport niches. Scheme 
B will likely have relative high acceptability since an additional cost will only be put on new 
ships, and since the additional cost will be small. Alternative C will be less costly for the 
sector than the other alternatives, since it implies that only emissions exceeding the standard 
must be paid charges for, and since there furthermore is a possibility for credits for lower-
than-standard emissions. This means that the acceptability of this scheme for many countries 
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will be higher than for most other schemes. On this background scheme D gets the lowest 
score, followed by A, which do somewhat better due to the possibility of free allowances. 
6.7 Recycling of possible revenues from regulation scheme to the 
marine sector 
All alternatives or schemes can be designed so that the charge or allowance income generated 
stays within the sector. The exception is B, where no revenues are generated. In the case that 
ship owners are allowed to sell allowances to other sectors if emissions are below the relevant 
standard, additional revenue for the ship sector could be generated. We have, however, 
chosen to give all schemes a fair score on this criterion. 
6.8 Legal feasibility within IMO 
There are few differences between the alternatives when it comes to the possibility of being 
legally adopted and implemented by all nations. Legal feasibility is more dependent on how a 
regulation scheme is designed. Schemes B and C, however, fits better with the functioning of 
IMO than the other schemes, and may therefore have higher legal feasibility. 
6.9 The regulation scheme should be implemented soon 
An emission trading system, as in alternative A, takes some time to establish, but there is 
experience from e.g. EU ETS. Establishing an emission charge system (D) will take some 
time, since putting a charge on international ship transport is a new experience. A design 
emission standard (B) could possibly be established in a shorter period. Alternatives C and E 
contain some complexity that requires a somewhat longer period. Taken together this 
perspective means that schemes B and A receive a higher score than the three other schemes. 
7 Summary 
This study of possible regulation systems for CO2 emissions from international shipping has 
shown that two main regulation types exist, either based on standards or on market-based 
instruments. The standard-based regulation schemes likely have a higher acceptability than a 
charge or a cap-and-trade system, but perform less well with regard to providing good 
incentives to reduce emissions and therefore lead to cost-effectiveness. The cap with charge is 
a type of compromise scheme between a standard-based and market-based scheme that has 
medium performance on account of both acceptability and incentives. In summary the choice 
of regulation scheme for CO2 emissions from international shipping is a trade-off between 
what is feasible in the short term and what is more desirable in the long term. 
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Annex 1. The climate effect of ship traffic 
The climate effect 
Shipping emits gases and particles that affect the chemical composition of the atmosphere and 
in consequence contribute to climate change. The key compounds emitted are carbon dioxide 
(CO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulfur dioxide (SO2). The emissions perturb atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4 and O3) and aerosols (sulphate, SO4), causing 
both warming and cooling effects. In addition, sulphate causes a significant indirect cooling, 
via changes in cloud microphysics. 
 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) 
Shipping emits CO2 due to fossil fuel combustion. CO2 is the dominating man-made 
greenhouse gas. CO2 has a long adjustment time in the atmosphere (>100 year), much longer 
than the atmospheric mixing timescale, so the climate effect of CO2 is the same for shipping 
as for other sources of CO2 emissions. Since the adjustment time of CO2 in the atmosphere is 
long, the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere depends on the emission history of CO2. 
Figur A1 shows historical CO2 ship emissions based on estimated sales of marine fuel in the 
period 1925 to 2002 (Endresen, et al. 2007) as well as estimated ship CO2 emissions based on 
a bottom up approach by Eyring, et al. (2005). The emission of CO2 has grown due to higher 
activity, but the emissions per tonne transported by sea have been significantly reduced as a 
result of larger and more energy efficient ships. The emission estimates differ between these 
two studies because of different assumptions and methods, see Figur A1. There is an ongoing 
scientific discussion on the present day fuel consumption in shipping, regarding whether 
bunker sale statistics are representative when estimating emissions or if the bunker sale 
statistics are too low (Corbett and Koehler 2003; Endresen, et al. 2004; Endresen, et al. 2007; 
Eyring, et al. 2005). The emission estimates of CO2 from shipping in year 2000 vary from 
600 to 800 Tg CO2 (including fishing), corresponding to 2.3-3.0% of the total man made CO2 
emissions. 
 
Nitrogen oxides (NOx) 
Nitrogen oxides (NOx)17 are emitted from shipping activity due to high temperature and 
pressure in the engine leading to a reaction between N2 and O2 from the ambient air. The 
estimate for NOx emission from shipping varies (10-21 Tg NO2 per year) corresponding to 11-
23% of the total anthropogenic NOx emission. The shipping sector has high NOx emissions in 
terms of g NOx/g fuel due to the high combustion temperatures necessary to increase engine 
efficiency. The ratio between shipping NOx emission and road transport NOx emission is 78% 
while the corresponding ratio for CO2 emissions is 19% (Eyring, et al. 2005). Emissions of 
NOx have both a warming and a cooling effect on the climate, warming due to production of 
ozone (O3) and cooling due to reduction in the lifetime of methane (CH4) through complex 
chemical reactions in the atmosphere (Berntsen et al. 2005; Fuglestvedt et al. 2007). 
 
Ozone (O3) is produced in the atmosphere in chemical reactions where NOx acts as a catalyst. 
Shipping emits NOx in clean regions of the marine atmosphere. The production of ozone from 
NOx emissions is more effective when emissions take place in clean regions than in already 
polluted areas. The lifetime of NOx emissions from shipping is short (~days), and the lifetime 
17 Nitrogen oxides (NOx): nitrogen monoxides (NO) and nitrogen dioxide(NO2) 
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of ozone is in order of weeks. The perturbation of the ozone from shipping is mainly 
restricted to the Northern Hemisphere, since the majority of the ship emissions occur there. 
NOx also reduces the atmospheric lifetime of CH4. NOx emissions increase the hydroxyl 
radical (OH) concentrations in the atmosphere. OH is the main oxidizing agent in the 
troposphere and controls the degradation of methane. Higher levels of OH lead to reduced 
lifetime of methane. Methane has a lifetime of approximately 10 years, and therefore the 
perturbation on the methane concentration due to NOx emissions occurs on a global scale. 
 
Sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
The fuel used in shipping has high sulfur content. Shipping contributes 6-11% of total 
anthropogenic SO2 emissions. The emission of SO2 is higher from the shipping sector than the 
road sector (Eyring, et al. 2005). When the fuel is combusted, SO2 is emitted and through 
chemical/microphysical processes sulphate (SO4) is formed. The sulphate aerosols can affect 
the climate directly or indirectly through changing the clouds properties, both having a 
cooling effect on climate. 
The direct effect of SO4 is by reflecting incoming solar light, and the solar radiation 
reaching the earth is reduced. 
The SO4 particles can also act as a cloud condensation nuclei. Ship emissions increases the 
particle numbers in the relative clean atmosphere over the ocean, and the droplet numbers 
increases and the size of the droplets decreases. Clouds with equal water content but with 
smaller droplets reflect more sunlight than clouds with larger droplets, and thus the 
reflectivity of the clouds increases due to ship emissions. This is called the first indirect effect 
of sulphate. The cloud cover area and the lifetime of the clouds can also change when 
additional particles are added in the atmosphere causing additional cooling (second indirect 
effect). 
The lifetime of sulphate is in order of days, and the effect is located over the ocean in both 
hemispheres. The ocean absorbs more solar light than land, so the effect of sulphate aerosols 
over the ocean is higher than over land. 
 
Other gases and particles 
Among the Kyoto gases, it is only CO2 emissions that are of significant magnitude. The 
emissions of N2O and CH4 from shipping are less than 0.1% of the total anthropogenic CO2 
equivalent emissions, and the effect of direct CH4 emission and N2O can be neglected. 
Carbon monoxide (CO) and non methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC) are 
precursors of ozone in the troposphere. The ozone production in clean environments like over 
ocean, is dominated by NOx emissions (Eyring, et al., 2007) and the emission of CO and 
NMVOC from shipping (from propulsion) is small.  
Shipping emissions also enhance other particles than sulphate that have a direct and indirect 
effect on climate. But sulphate particles are the dominant particle for these two effects. Lauer, 
et al. (2007) estimated that 75% of the direct and indirect effect of aerosols from shipping are 
due to sulphate. 
Recently a study has indicated that annually approximately 60 000 cardiopulmonary and 
lung cancer deaths are due to particulate matter emissions from shipping, with most deaths 
occurring near coastlines in Europe, East Asia, and South Asia (Corbett, et al. 2007). 
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Quantifying the climate effect 
Emissions from shipping consist of various gases and particles that have warming or cooling 
(or both) effects on climate. The effects occur on different timescales ranging from days to 
centuries, and the spatial distributions of the climate effects are different. These differences in 
fundamental characteristics make illustrations and comparisons complicated. 
A common way to illustrate the climate effect is to use the concept radiative forcing (RF). 
It is defined as the change in the energy balance of the earth/atmosphere given in Watt per 
square meter (W/m2). It is often used as a proxy for changes in global mean temperature since 
many studies indicate that RF is proportional to global temperature change. (Some recent 
studies indicate, however, that there are deviations from this relationship for some 
mechanisms). 
Several studies have calculated RF due to shipping for different components, given as 
current RF vs pre-industrial time. The results are summarized in Figur A2 taken from Lauer et 
al. (2007).  
The RF from CO2 for shipping is approximately 2% of total RF for CO2 given by IPCC 
2007 (Forster et al. 2007). The main uncertainty in RF calculation for CO2 from shipping is 
the uncertainty in the emission estimates. The level of scientific understanding of the CO2 
effect given in IPCC 2007 is high. 
The NOx emissions cause both warming and cooling effects due to the effects on O3 and 
CH4. There are uncertainties in the emission estimate for NOx, as well as large uncertainties in 
the chemistry modeling. Since the magnitude of the warming and cooling effects of NOx 
emissions are of about equal size the net effect is small but the uncertainty range includes 
both positive and negative values (net warming and net cooling). Eyring, et al. (2007) 
estimated 20% uncertainty in the RF calculation of O3 from shipping due to use of different 
models. In addition is the large uncertainty in the emission estimate. The level of scientific 
understanding of the O3 effect is labeled medium in IPCC 2006, and the RF estimate from O3 
shipping is 1.6-6% of the total man made best estimate given in IPCC Third Assessment 
Report (TAR).   
The scientific understanding of the direct effect of aerosols is medium to low. The best 
estimate of the total anthropogenic direct aerosols effect given in IPCC 2007 is -0.5 W/m2 
with uncertainty range -0.9 to -0.1 W/m2. Various estimates of RF for the direct effect of ship 
emission correspond to 2.8 to 7.6% of the best estimate of total man made aerosol direct 
effect. There are large uncertainty in these estimates due to uncertainty in the emissions and 
uncertainty in the calculations of chemical and radiative effects. 
For the indirect effect of aerosols, the scientific understanding is lower. It is labelled low in 
IPCC 2007. The best estimate given in IPCC 2007 for the total indirect aerosol effect is -0.7 
W/m2 with uncertainty range -1.8 to -0.3 W/m2. There is a large spread in the calculation of 
the indirect aerosols RF from shipping. Lauer, et al., (2007) used three different emission 
inventories, and calculated RF indirect from shipping to be 27-86% of the best estimate given 
in IPCC 2007. In addition to the uncertainty in the emissions, the uncertainty in the model 
calculation is large for the indirect aerosol effect. 
Despite the wide range of RF values calculated, there is high confidence that the present-
day net RF due to shipping is negative. In comparison, the net radiative forcing from aviation 
and road transport sector are positive (Sausen, et al. 2005, Fuglestvedt et al. 2007). 
Fuglestvedt et al. (2007) also find a negative net RF from shipping. In a forward looking 
perspective this negative effect occur on short time scales but disappears on longer time 
scales. 
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The negative net RF from shipping does not imply a direct cancellation of the warming 
effect. The components with negative RF can affect other parameters than the global mean 
temperature; e.g. the hydrological cycle and wind patterns (Matthews and Caldeira 2007). 
Emissions of SO2 and NOx have several other indirect effects; e.g. acidification or 
fertilization of the ocean which will further affect the exchange of CO2 between the 
atmosphere and the ocean (Doney et al., 2007) or production on ozone which may affect the 
uptake of CO2 in the biosphere (Sitch et al. 2007) 
It is important to note that this historical perspective is not particularly useful for 
policymakers for comparison between the climate effect from different species for the 
shipping sector. The RF calculation for CO2 is based on the whole emission history due to the 
long lifetime of CO2 in the atmosphere. An emission based comparison of how current and 
future emissions affect future climate is then needed. (See Fuglestvedt et al. 2007 for a 
discussion of these perspectives). 
The RF from shipping CO2 will probably increase in the future. The other RF components 
are highly dependent on the technology in the fleet and sulphur content of the fuel, and are 
assumed to be reduced in the future. In addition to impacts on the climate, local (in coastal 
areas and harbors with heavy traffic) and regional (long-range transport) air quality problems 
are of concern because of their impact on human health. 
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Figure A1. Two estimates of historic CO2 emissions from shipping. Endresen, et al. (2007): 
Development of CO2 ship emissions, based on estimated sales of marine fuel, 1920–2002 
(including the fishing and military fleet). Note that no data are available for World War II. 
Eyring, et al. (2005): CO2 emissions development from civilian and military shipping 
calculated based on ship number statistics and average engine statistics. The emission 
estimate in year 2000 is based on detailed fleet-modeling. 
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Figure A2. Annual mean radiative forcing due to emissions from international shipping in 
mWm−2. Values for CO2, O3, CH4 (reduced lifetime), and SO4 (direct aerosol effect) are 
taken from Endresen et al. (2003) and Eyring et al. (2007). The indirect aerosol effect 
calculated by Capaldo et al. (1999) includes the first indirect effect of sulfate plus organic 
material aerosols only, the error bar depicts the range spanned by their additional sensitivity 
studies. The estimated direct and the indirect aerosol effect calculated in this study also 
includes changes due to BC, POM, NH4, NO3, and H2O from shipping in addition to SO4 and 
refers to the changes in all-sky shortwave radiation fluxes and net cloud forcing (sum of 
shortwave and long-wave cloud forcing) at the top of the atmosphere, respectively. The net 
cloud forcing is calculated from the differences in the simulated all-sky fluxes and the 
corresponding clear-sky fluxes at top of the atmosphere. The global annual mean RF due to 
ship tracks is taken from the satellite data analysis by Schreier et al. (2007). [Figure taken 
from (Lauer, et al. 2007).] 
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